Web3 Galaxy Brain 🌌🧠

Nicholas: Welcome to Web3 Galaxy Brain. My name is Nicholas. At the end of each week, I sit down for a casual Friday afternoon conversation with some of the brightest people building Web3. In this episode, I'm joined by Juicebox contributor Mr. Goldstein and FinTech PM and DeFi thinker Squarish Bread to discuss staked governance tokens. The conversation opens with a recap of the curve wars and the fascinating relationship between yield emission governance tokens and staking aggregators like Convex. The conversation then turns to VE Banny, the work in progress staked Juicebox token and the many intriguing designs active contributors are considering. This episode was mind bending and really fun to record. I hope you enjoy the show. So welcome. I invited Mr. Goldstein to talk a little bit about the staking mechanics that he's been thinking about along with a bunch of other people in Juicebox. And I hear that you know something about curve and convex Squarish Bread.

squarishbread: Yeah, I'm fairly familiar with the ecosystem.

Nicholas: Interesting topic, but I guess there's lots of different mechanics. There's vesting tokens, there's sort of governance advantages. to staked tokens is something Juicebox was talking about. I guess there's a lot of different subsets of mechanics you can apply here.

squarishbread: Yeah, definitely. The governance side is interesting. And then I mean, I don't know, I'll admit I haven't kept up on JVX recently. So I don't know where you guys are going. And if you're trying to like build liquidity, but yeah, then it gets very interesting as well in terms of like, the voting, the bribing, the, you know, the delegating of the bribing, blah, blah, blah.

Mr. Goldstein: Squarish Bread for context and Nick for context for you too. Squarish Bread was probably one of the first people that I called to get his take on creating VEJVX, which now we know is an NFT version, but I ideated with him early, early, early on when like three months ago, we just started thinking about it because he's very familiar with Curve and Convex.

Nicholas: So maybe it would be good to start with like a basics of, is Curve sort of the first puzzle piece worth understanding in this? Or is there something even before that?

Mr. Goldstein: V2, for everybody's knowledge that's listening, Juicebox is going through a launch of a new version and V2 is going to be launched probably pretty soon and it's already has been built. That will allow us to start a staking mechanism. And the staking mechanism as it currently stands will allow JVX token holders to stake a certain amount of JVX for a certain period of time and in return get an NFT. So it's not going to be same as Curve getting a VE token. It's going to be an NFT that represents a staked JVX. But the longer the stake is, the stronger the voting power is. And this is very, very similar to Curve, meaning that if you want to stake for four years, the conversion will be one to one. So the power of your NFT will have X amount of JVX staked behind it. Does that make sense or did they lose everybody?

squarishbread: That makes sense. Out of curiosity, why an NFT and not a fungible token?

Mr. Goldstein: Very good question. Nick, do you want to take it or should I?

Nicholas: You go for it. I think you can explain it just as well as anyone.

Mr. Goldstein: I think it comes down to the user base and the adopters. We found that there's a lot of value in providing a visual element to it and having something unique to the users. And the DAO adopters currently are much more oriented towards NFTs and DeFi. And providing them with a tool that has some identity attached to it is much more valuable.

squarishbread: That makes sense. I was thinking like maybe because it can be more one to one with the DAO. Are there situations, though, where you'd want to like stake a little bit more? Right. And then like, would you get a second NFT?

Nicholas: What's the latest on this? I was here for part of the discussion, but maybe not the latest version.

Mr. Goldstein: We also have Stevie G here so that can add additional color, who's also from the DAO. But the latest on it is you can have to stake multiple times, meaning that if you have a wallet with a million GBX and you want to stake in 10,000 increments and get a bunch of NFTs, you can do that. But the voting power is going to be determined by the amount of tokens underlying the NFT. So it just depends how many NFTs you want to have. You can have one that's underlying power of a thousand or you can have a thousand with underlying power of one.

squarishbread: That makes sense. I guess the tradeoffs just come into when you're actually doing the voting. You have to like maybe vote multiple times. That's not like good or bad. It's just that rather there's no right approach. It's just tradeoffs. Like if people like the NFTs more than that makes sense.

Mr. Goldstein: Yes. The tradeoff might come if and I know the DAO spoke about it is slowly move towards a environment where it's on-chain governance and then there's potentially some tradeoffs. But at the point now, very few.

squarishbread: Cool. Sorry if I sidetracked that a little.

Nicholas: So staking of the JBX token in order to get NFTs that represent that stake position is the plan. And then maybe there's a variety of possible NFTs you could get. So maybe people will be incentivized to in order to have a variety of the different available NFT representations of their staking position, maybe stake multiple times for the sort of memetic. I think part of when the discussion part of what made sense about that to me for Juicebox is that, as you say, a large part of the draw to Juicebox is this sort of NFT wave of DAOs rather than DeFi protocol DAOs. So there is something also about being able to wear it as a PFP or just have it as a part of coming from that NFT culture.

Mr. Goldstein: Absolutely. And my PFP currently is V0.6 probably of how this should look like.

squarishbread: Yeah, that's really cool. It's kind of interesting because like OG, you know, VE curve holders are like the curve overlords, as people sometimes refer to them since their voting power is so high. It would be kind of interesting if they could like really top that.

Mr. Goldstein: Right. There's probably some bragging rights that should be assigned to that. And having it as a PFP is interesting. Why just have it as tokens?

Nicholas: Actually, I don't know. In Juicebox has I know that there's been discussion about the quantity in the period of staking, altering the visual representation or which particular NFT you get. But I don't know if has there been any talk of doing collections that are only available, say, in the first month of staking or something like that?

squarishbread: Yeah, like different vintages.

Nicholas: Yeah.

Mr. Goldstein: To be fair, I don't know the exact latest on that, but I know there's been talk about it. I don't think we're aligned, the DAO aligned on anything particular. If you make Stevie G a speaker as well, he might be able to comment.

Nicholas: All right. We'll see if he's available. So, OK, so that's some of the idea about how the staking mechanism works at a basic level, UX kind of level from the perspective of someone who holds JBX. But I don't know if you've mentioned yet what the benefits are of staking.

Mr. Goldstein: Initially, the benefits of staking should be just bragging rights. The ability to add value on top of it and build value off the top of it will come over time. And the interesting part is building it in a way that you can continuously build on top of it later on. It's wherever the community will want to take it. We can take it anywhere from discounts on pricing to yield to a million other ideas. But the goal is to build a system that enables that.

Nicholas: So essentially, the stake tokens as represented by NFTs become sort of like a symbolic of loyalty to the protocol. And then other features or benefits could be granted to people based on which of those staking positions they've taken.

Mr. Goldstein: Absolutely. And Squaresbrite here, maybe you can jump in with a curved thought because that would happen in Curve early on, wasn't it? It was just bragging rights.

squarishbread: Yeah, well, there was an interesting thing where I'm trying to remember the exact history here, but they started sharing the revenue with in the beginning. It voted on, you know, like fees and liquidity pools and where the fees go to. in the liquidity pools, you know, like which ones get more fees, etc. Which at the end of the day, the curve token, one of the big things it does is incentivize liquidity into different trading pairs. And so by changing the fees on different pools, it incentivizes more people to deposit liquidity there, which tightens the liquidity on these stable pairs, which is what it was in the beginning. But what they started doing is they made it so that revenue also gets shared. And so, you know, a portion of the platform's revenue goes to date. curve holders in the form of one of the LP tokens, actually. But but yeah, so it's transformed from, you know, it's like at the end of the day, it's kind of like an equity, right? That owns the protocol. They get dividends and they also get to vote on the like even more than, you know, traditional stockholders vote on. You know, it's not just like big board things. It's like day to day operations, which is pretty cool.

Nicholas: Does that end up working out in Curve's favor thus far? The voting on, I guess, is the whole convex thing that we have to get into, right?

squarishbread: Yeah, I mean, it's hard to say, like, if it's like good or bad. It's definitely like it's still here, which I think is actually a sign of it being good. Convex definitely added a big loop to the whole situation because, you know, one of the disadvantages theory of staking curve is that you lose your liquidity because it's it's locked up for a long period of time for the most, you know, most curve holders. I think the average locking for curve holders is over a year and the max you can do it is four years. I did a four year lock, actually, which is kind of crazy in the world of DeFi, right? So one of the disadvantages of that, though, is that people, you know, can't get out of their position. And so a convex did. Well, one other big issue is that there were original people that had so much liquidity or so much locked curve rather that they actually couldn't really compete in getting some of the higher fees backing up to the basics of curve. The way that it works is you can put your liquidity into a pool. And one of the big functions of the curve locked curve token is it will boost your reward on your liquidity in that pool. But there's always like a range of rewards that you can get. And so the higher your ratio of the curve to liquidity provided, the more the higher your rate will be in terms of rewards that you get issued as yield. And so over time, some of the original LP holders had such higher ratios that it was really hard for new people and especially people with like small amounts of money to really compete and get those higher rates. It was. it was basically like impossible, right? You had to have like ridiculous ratios. And so what convex did is they came along and they created an aggregator that allowed people to one deposit their curve, their their curve LP tokens there and to deposit their curve there and to give them a synthetic or a wrapped version of curve, which is CVXCRV. And then they got to, you know, using all of everyone's locked VECRV, they made it so that they could boost everyone that put LP tokens. there's rewards. And so, you know, it helped essentially late arrivers and also, you know, smaller folks in the pond, you know, on top of that, they issued their own token CVX. And so they incentivized CVXCRV deposits so much that they ended up becoming. I think they have over 50 percent of CRV now, which is pretty wild.

Nicholas: Let me see if I get this straight.

squarishbread: So start with curve.

Nicholas: Curve is a stable coin. AMM, is that a fair way to describe it? Yeah. And it issues curve tokens or it issues people who provide liquidity, receive a token in exchange. And that's the token we were originally talking about. No, we're talking about.

squarishbread: Yeah.

Nicholas: Yeah.

squarishbread: So exactly. So curve is a stable coin AMM or it originally was. It's actually morphed a bit. That has a CRV token, which is both a governance token and it is what the rewards for the LPs who put liquidity there.

Nicholas: OK, so I get it. So back in the day, whenever that was, I provide liquidity. I receive a token that represents my liquidity position. And then in the first case, it was sort of just bragging rights and the ability to vote in governance with that token, which is frequent enough for curve that it matters. However, people didn't have enough tokens. So and in addition to all of that, I'm receiving at some point they introduced revenue sharing. So people who have provided liquidity are receiving rewards for having provided liquidity. But then because the people who started, who came into curve earliest were such whales, that was kind of the impetus for the creation of convex. or just in general, I guess convex was required because the staking. Actually, the part that I don't understand is how can you transfer the tokens to convex? if they are they're tradable despite being locked in the staking vault?

squarishbread: Yeah. All right. Let me summarize some stuff to simplify that. So curve is an AMM, like you mentioned. People can deposit liquidity there in the form of like stable coins for the most part in the beginning. And, you know, when they deposit their stable coins, just like any other yield farm, get an LP token that represents that position, etc. When they do that, the rewards are paid out in the form of CRV, which is the curve governance token. The rewards that you're paid out on your LP positions can vary based on how much of that governance token you've locked in the platform.

Nicholas: Got it. OK, so you're getting like a multiplier essentially for having locked CRV and the rewards. The rewards are paid in CRV, but the liquidity position is not represented by CRV. It's represented by some other specific pool.

squarishbread: Yeah. And LP token in the same way that like swaps or you swap or any other AMM forms.

Nicholas: OK, so it's just that I'm getting the rewards in CRV.

squarishbread: Yeah.

Nicholas: And if I stake CRV, then I multiply those rewards or some factor of those rewards.

squarishbread: Exactly. If you lock your if you lock your CRV, you get something called VECRV, which is VODESCROAD CRV.

Nicholas: And so the longer that I lock it for, the greater the reward multiplier.

squarishbread: Exactly.

Nicholas: And then that VECRV is transferable still?

squarishbread: No, so VECRV is not transferable. OK, OK. So this, combined with the fact that whales were kind of ruling, is one of the big things that brought along Convex.

Nicholas: So for Convex, I send them the raw CRV and they do the staking piece, but give me the Convex token, which is tradable.

squarishbread: Yeah. So Convex does a couple of things. They they allow you to lock your CRV token with them. And so they get the VECRV and they issue you a tradable version of it. Right. They also allow you to deposit your Curve LP tokens or to stake your Curve LP tokens there, which represent the stable coin positions that you have.

Nicholas: And how do they take advantage of pooling those LP tokens?

squarishbread: When you do it with them, then they share, you know, that you basically deposit it to their smart contract and then they go deposit it on Curve, right? And so what it allows them to do is share the pooled locked Curve rewards or the pooled boosted reward rates with the people that deposit the LP positions.

Nicholas: OK, so I'm staking both the LP tokens and the Curve and then they're using my Curve as well as everybody else's to create VECRV, which they use to multiply the rewards on pooled liquidity tokens rather than, you know, and also I can also separately stake those LP tokens. And so they're applying that multiplier to the collective LP tokens.

squarishbread: Exactly. And one like weird idiosyncrasy of AMMs to understand is on most of these AMMs, you deposit, you know, call it USDC and die, right? And you get an LP token and then you actually stake that LP token. And there's like some kind of base reward rate usually, which is pure trading fees. And then there's a rewards rate which is, you know, issued in the form of token of the protocol. And this is fairly universal. And so in order to get that rewards rate, you have to stake the LP token somewhere.

Nicholas: It's a pool too, right?

squarishbread: Yes. OK. And so, yeah, that's like a weird idiosyncrasy where you get the you deposit funds and get the LP token and then you stake the LP token. And so what you're doing with Convex is you're staking your Curve LP token with them, which they go and then stake with Curve, right? So that you can get the boosted rewards.

Nicholas: Because they're getting superior rewards than you would staking the LP tokens yourself.

squarishbread: Exactly. Because you don't have enough locked Curve to get the boosted rewards rates, but Convex does.

Nicholas: In fact, both of these parts are necessary for Convex to work, right? Like they couldn't just get the VE Curve and not have a LP generating rewards to be multiplied. They sort of need both.

squarishbread: Exactly. Exactly. They need both. It's like, yeah, it only works with both. I mean, it could in theory work with one, but it wouldn't have as much of a powerful flywheel effect.

Nicholas: Around when did Convex come out?

Mr. Goldstein: I think it was May of 2021.

Nicholas: OK. So and this is kind of surprising because did people anticipate this when Curve designed its staking mechanics?

squarishbread: I don't think so. Hard to say. I've never been in the room with like the 6 to 12 people at Curve.

Mr. Goldstein: But nobody understood Curve staking mechanics for probably a year. And it's interesting to bring it back full circle back to GBX and think about how the staking mechanics now with NFTs are going to be different or similar. And I think one thing that's important to note is the mechanics theoretically are somewhat similar that the voting power changes based on the length of the staking. But because it's an NFT, it's transferable. So the relationship between Curve and Convex that we see is technically unnecessary in the case of GBX staking.

Nicholas: Because the VE tokens are, VEGBX are going to be NFTs and they're not going to have the limitation of borking the transfer function. You will be able to transfer them. So it potentially vertically integrates the Convex piece or something?

Mr. Goldstein: Theoretically, yes.

Nicholas: Except the reason, the reasoning behind making the VE Curve non-transferable is so that the staking position is meaningful, right?

squarishbread: So another benefit is that in theory, it decreases the sell pressure on the token. And so by incentivizing people to lock their CRV, it decreased the sell pressure a bit and also took CRV off the market to constrain supply.

Nicholas: OK, so it takes it off the market. So in the case of GBX, it's taking GBX out of the market because it's locked, staked. But why would Curve want the positions to be, VE Curve to be not tradable, whereas for GBX it doesn't matter as much?

Mr. Goldstein: In the case of GBX, the decision to make it transferable and make it a transferable NFC versus a non-transferable NFC is to avoid the downstream potential Curve Convex effect. Because for every hack, there's a hack. So why go there?

Nicholas: Right, there's no point. But then is there? is staking meaningful if it's not locked up? I guess in this case it is because it's being transmuted into NFTs rather than GBX. So it is out of circulation in that sense.

Mr. Goldstein: Yes, it's out of circulation in a tiny fractions, it now becomes in circulation in large fractions. So you will have two markets, one of the pure liquid GBX that can be tradable in Uniswap and then you have another one probably of NFTs on OpenSea. And those NFTs will accrue value not just by the amount of GBX backing them, but also some cultural value based on the characters represented there. Same as we all, same as any PFP.

Nicholas: So it sounds like there's a pretty good argument for the idea of vintages of the images or the properties as well, just the metadata of the stakes positions that maybe it makes sense to have 2021 stakes positioned or, you know, summer 2022, certain PFPs you couldn't get later or earlier.

Mr. Goldstein: Theoretically, yes, but the amount of complexity that it adds from the initial launch is a ton. So it's and that's what I love about GBX overall is the simplicity of the first product. Release the minimum viable product, see adoption and then build on top of that.

squarishbread: As long as it doesn't box you into a corner. Absolutely.

Mr. Goldstein: And we have the specialist here with a long blue hair that makes sure that never boxes into a corner.

squarishbread: Sorry, guys, I cut out there a bit in law service or something. But why if you allow the NFTs to be traded and in theory, you know, that can create a market for them? Is there a risk that it goes, you know, they kind of get traded away if people aren't incentivized to keep them?

Mr. Goldstein: Theoretically, yes, they can get traded away.

squarishbread: But for bragging rights in the beginning, then it makes sense. But I guess what are like. what are people getting by staking their J.B. Act besides bragging rights in the beginning?

Mr. Goldstein: In general, correct me if I'm wrong, you're speaking now, but in the beginning, it's bragging rights.

Jango: I have no idea. I mean, we're we'll we'll kind of see. But for sure votes. I mean, one day, like once we move governance that direction, it's a voting utility and it's backed by J.B. X, which is backed by the Treasury. It's kind of a cascading sense of representation of something and just creating, I guess, more more artful and prominent representations of of the the actual membership utility, I suppose.

squarishbread: It makes sense. And so J.B. X has a decent amount of revenue, right? Like is this will the protocol revenue be directed to J.B. X holders and or J.B.

Jango: X stakers in some way?

Mr. Goldstein: That's for the community to decide. The beauty of this is there's a lot of optionality. was building a very fungible and very composable base layer for staking. The base contracts are very easy and then you can add the block on top of them later.

Jango: Yeah, there's a lot you could do in some way. It's already happening. Like once fees come into the Treasury, it adds to the shared Treasury and it means J.B. X tokens in consequence to the payer who are probably receiving or receiving fewer J.B. X over time as funding cycles go on. So, yes, we're issuing more J.B. X as funds come in, but proportional. there's more funds in the Treasury. And granted, we are taking J.B. X out to pay for or I guess operations and such. But there's different ways to do it. So you can imagine that fees instead of going into the Treasury and minting more J.B. X, you can imagine potentially like putting by pressure directly on an AMM or minting some other distribution effect or something.

squarishbread: It's kind of I'm trying to think of a situation where people like one of the big things that happens a lot with curve and convex that people want to improve the liquidity of their token of their random stable coin or whatever. And to do that, they will purchase a bunch of governance rights in order to vote for higher fees on their pool in order to incentivize people to deposit things into that, you know, go buy it on the market and deposit that thing for yield. Right. And I'm trying to think of like what the metaphor would be here. And if there is a situation where someone might want to buy a bunch of governance rights of J.B. X and to do that, you know, like do you buy the J.B. X token or do you go buy a bunch of it like to sweep the floor of the J.B. X NFT locked NFTs. Right. And if you were going to do that, I guess it's not that weird to sweep the floor. Pretty easy to do something like Jam XYZ.

Nicholas: Sounds pretty hot, actually.

Jango: Yeah, especially if the Banny NFT you're sweeping is the sweeper NFT. And I think there's one that holds a broom or something.

Nicholas: It's nice because it gets to show up in like a context, context app or other sort of wallet following utilities. You get to see. you see the NFT activity generally in those more than the ERC20 activity. So you'll see Django swept 20 Bannies.

Jango: I mean, it's funny because there is theoretically a floor that you can evaluate the asset to a given the current spending routine of the Dow and the general trend of fees and like how long the NFT is locked for. They can kind of imagine what it could be worth given that it's backed by J.B. X and ETH. But it's I feel like most folks don't have a precise calculation in mind when they're making these decisions. So who's to say what's going to happen?

Nicholas: So the one thing that concerns me, but I think I know the response already is, you know, let's say there's a vote going through and it's to pay me a million dollars out of the treasury. I could just go buy a bunch of these staked position NFTs and vote for myself. At the end of the day, no different than going and buying a bunch of J.B. X and voting. But the staking mechanism here at least doesn't seem to protect at all from sort of not quite flash loaning, but just in time governance position taking.

Mr. Goldstein: Probably not, but it's very, very similar to what's happening now with J.B. X overall. You can do that by collecting accumulating tokens. You're just going to be accumulating NFT position. It probably makes it a little bit better because if you lock for less than four years, your voting power is lower and the people that's going to lock for four years are the ones that are more committed and incentivized to support the project over the long run. And less incentivized to sell.

squarishbread: So if this NFT can be sold, why would you ever not lock it for four years?

Nicholas: Good question.

squarishbread: It's like, oh, I only want 50 percent governance.

Nicholas: So this is the 721ification of J.B. X.

Mr. Goldstein: Very good question.

squarishbread: Because one of the benefits of having the locked governance token that people are incentivized to lock is that it forces decentralization to a certain extent. It enforces decentralization because there's probably going to be more people.

Mr. Goldstein: So the one thing I can see, one rationale is if you assume that the DAO will build additional rewards besides voting and the rewards will be somehow distributed between time periods or time frames and going to be distinguished by time frames. You might be incentivized to not only lock for four years.

Jango: I suppose it also depends on who's going to buy the four year lock position eventually. I wonder what the market will be for those and if it will just be tossed around given the current ballot at hand. But it is nice having shorter periods to give you the liquidity. I mean, like right now, if someone comes in and buys a lot of J.B. X. to influence a vote, let's say like raise the treasury distribution limit and like route it all to themselves, then everyone who has J.B. X. can essentially just like leave and burn J.B. X. and get their treasuries back in some sense. So it's slightly disincentivizing folks from making short term abusive decisions. But I'm sure there's like little things that like aren't quite crystal clear. So I'd love to hear more. More of these like poking. How can we break it and how can we make it better?

squarishbread: Yeah, like NFT liquidity isn't perfect, right? Like it's not like a ERC20 token that can, you know, you can sell any token for any amount basically on an AMM at all times.

Nicholas: If the market is efficient, there will be perfect deficiency between the stake positions and the underlying quantity of J.B. X. Right?

squarishbread: Yeah, I mean, curving convex do that by having AMM pools that are with high rewards, right? Like convex votes to keep the CVX, CRV and the CRV token pool high, which keeps the slippage low. And like as a result, like that stays pretty even. But I don't know what the instead of like I don't know how the liquidity between the vote locked positions and the J.B. X. token itself would go. I mean, it would be a little bit funky.

Nicholas: Well, because there's not like floor on a locked NFT is higher than the underlying J.B. X. plus gas, then it would behoove you to just lock that much yourself. Right?

squarishbread: Yeah. I'm thinking back to the situation that you brought up of like, what if I wanted to? what if I just wanted to buy a bunch of J.B. X. tokens and vote all of the treasurer to go to me? Right. And like that's that's like basically impossible when the tokens when the locked tokens are not tradable because there's more that's locked at any given time than what's out there. Right. And so no one can really just like go by, you know, do like basically a 51 percent attack on the protocol.

Nicholas: Wait, why is there more that's locked than out there?

squarishbread: Because the incentives are so high to lock. There is a large amount of it that's locked. And over time and the lock periods are so long that because of the I don't remember the exact, but because of the schedule of new or the emission schedule of new tokens that get released as yield, there's not like enough that's coming on market in order to counteract all the stuff that's been locked for so

Nicholas: long. I mean, one thing that's interesting is you could that you could do it with multiple steps or just put the holders of the stake tokens can claim some portion of the reserve tokens as a form of reward for for staking. Although I wonder it does make me wonder if there if there's something that's keeping track of how long you held an NFT for or just the fact if everything is binary, do you hold it right now or not? Do you hold it at the time of a governance vote or not? Or did you hold it for six months prior to this governance vote or prior to claiming your reward?

squarishbread: Yeah, that's interesting. The other thing that's that's a really cool way to do it, actually, is to enforce the duration of holding before you can vote.

Nicholas: Maybe that actually makes more sense than not allowing people to transfer because you just get this wrapped problem, the convex problem. If you try and the transfer function, people would are.

squarishbread: I'm not sure that people would say that convex is bad.

Nicholas: No, but OK, so I think we didn't really cover the main thing, which is that the whole purpose of or the whole function of convex, aside from just giving you more yield, is that it's used to vote on curve rewards. Until it is a new token. So if if I drop a new year, C20, maybe or a new stable coin, maybe I'll take a position in convex in order to influence curve rewards.

squarishbread: Yeah. And well, what convex did, which is interesting, is they allowed people who had locked their curve there and then staked the token that they get from that to do the voting through convex themselves. And so convex doesn't actually do any of the decision making as a protocol. They then decentralize that decision making of where the votes go back to the people that lock the things there. And so it's like truly just a wrapper at this point that boosts people's rewards. And so it kind of took away the whales and took away the liquidity problem for the locked tokens and made it so that but kept the decentralization of the voting. You know, it's hard to say whether or not they did that, you know, like in the good interest of the curve protocol, probably because they rely on the curve protocol being successful. So like working the curve protocol governance would be bad, right?

Mr. Goldstein: I really like the idea of being able to vote only after a certain period of holding. I'm trying to wrap my head around if there is a technical way to implement that. If there's an elegant way to implement not being able to vote unless you hold the GBX, BENNY NFT for a period of time.

Nicholas: Django, do you think storing the last transfer on chain is reasonable?

Jango: Something like that. The governor Bravo contract is like does that whole snapshotting dance as tokens are transferred around, which determines your voting weight. I'm sure you could derive some some new voting weight based on that. Still a little unsure like what the what it like really solves for. Like I think the concern I wonder how how different it is from the fact that like right now with GBX, for instance, just like the year 2020, sure, like we like a subset of people could sell their GBX to some person who's like quoting them some price and like, all right, they'll sell them to them and then they can theoretically govern the treasury. But it does I think like any of these systems do rely on the community distributing itself wide enough so that it's difficult for someone to organize that takeover in some way. I wonder like if this is if it's like being like over preventative thinking as opposed to like solving the real problem, which probably is just distribution to more people and getting the thing out there. And more people's hands like decentralization essentially.

Nicholas: So like a bad actor, though, could drop a contract where you can earn fees off of renting out your GBX or staked GBX and allow whoever to pay to use it, right? But it would require somebody exert the effort to actually build such a contract.

Jango: Sure. And then whoever's like renting the thing out might make short term yield or whatever. But the underlying asset would lose a lot of value if the attacker managed to like do anything or pull substantial amounts of funds from the treasury. I think like everyone's kind of working together to keep the treasury honest in a way. And the thing like everything is worthless if that's compromised. So if you hold a position that's backed by the treasury, not in your interest to make short term trades, although you could always like sell your asset, but you'd have to have like enough people come together and make that trade to like a few organized parties or like one organized party that's going to execute the takeover. And I mean, obviously, the network's still young, but still, it still only has to coerce like, you know, sub 100 people to make that happen. But it's already like fairly difficult, right?

Nicholas: I guess the most contentious thing in juicebox governance that I'm aware of was the attempt by some more speculative members of the DAO to change the fee structures or whatever or fund marketing and listing on centralized exchanges, etc. So I could have imagined, you know, there was a sizable percentage of the voting population that was regularly voting in favor of short termist proposals. I don't know if that they still constitute such a significant portion of the token holders, but not totally inconceivable that that group could have written up a rental contract.

Jango: Yeah, I mean, it was like an interesting situation because it was like new ideas and new energy coming in. And certainly, like I think knowing the community is really interesting and just kind of writing off other ideas as that's like objectively wrong because it doesn't it didn't like wasn't floating by the cannon. that was like being discussed prior. But I mean, ultimately, in order to distribute those new tokens out there, they put a shit ton of funds in the treasury. I think it went up by like the price of ETH like 15 or 20 million dollars. So like everyone who held before then, if the project would have gone in a direction that everyone is like absolutely unhappy with, everyone would have just like burned their token and left. But it's like, you know, a fat chunk of the treasury. It's interesting because project again.

Nicholas: OK, maybe start the project again. But I do get the feeling that the majority of the people, the sort of people who were there before that event would probably be a little bit reticent to actually burn their tokens versus the. maybe some speculative investors would be more willing to just, you know, at a high or something.

Jango: I'm like super fan of of either way. I mean, if you don't agree with what's happening and I mean, it's the whole point. Like if someone comes in right now and it's 51 percent of the tokens, it's going to be extraordinarily expensive. You have to put like hundreds of millions of dollars into the treasury to mint that amount. And like the value of each JVX is going to go up like substantially. And so if you come in and mint 51 percent and you're not trying to like play by. if you're not trying to like appease the community, then everyone is there for the suite. And then like exit.

Nicholas: Right. It doesn't really make sense in a world of open source to do that. Was it just in steam is the classic example. I think he tried to take over. He tried to take over. He bought like 51 percent attack through purchasing steam, STM and the community forked his tokens out.

squarishbread: Yeah, I remember that.

Nicholas: I wasn't there at the time, but it's I've heard it referenced as a kind of canonical example of like layer zero wins.

Jango: In this case, like literally the community before would be like taking from that deposit. Right. So if someone came in and put the hundreds of millions, they're literally giving it to everyone who was there before if they don't convince them that they should stay.

Nicholas: That's a seed round.

squarishbread: Yes. It like is a new valuation of the entire protocol, whatever. I kind of forgot once I looked into it. Yeah, that kind of inherently protects against that type of thing.

Jango: The tricky thing about the V thing, though, is it's it's not directly redeemable for the treasury like the JVX. token is redeemable for the treasury. But the token is just representation of JVX. If you hold the V, you no longer have that exit protection. You can't just like leave.

Nicholas: So it's sort of protecting the treasury in a way or it's making a long term guarantee about the treasury.

Jango: For sure.

squarishbread: But it's also giving a way for people to get voting rights, which then gets them access to potentially change how that treasury is used without actually taking the trip.

Jango: Yes. And maybe there's some redemption situation that's worth at least considering accommodating for.

squarishbread: One other interesting thing that I've seen is so like I know I keep going back to curve. I feel like that's how this was framed originally. So I'll keep doing it. So curves like arguably the most resilient protocol out there, right? If you just look at AUM and think of that and even they had a situation where they have an emergency council. I forget the actual term. I think it's emergency council of like six highly influential community members that can come in and make quick governance decisions in situations that could hurt the protocol. It's kind of a tricky thing to do. We have people that are like aligned with the protocol long term and also like have too much money to care about losing reputational risk. But they did. There was, I think, two situations where the security emergency protocol council had to come in and make decisions. It was with like the Mondo board or something. I forget exactly. But like even the most resilient protocol out there had to do this, which is just something to consider, even as like as crazy as, you know, as many situations as you can think of. You might need some kind of like backdoor short term decision making aspect.

Jango: Yeah, it's pretty wild. I want to already pretty cool case studies that we're building on. It's like tricky when your head's down, building stuff for months and years to like pay attention to the details of everything going on around.

squarishbread: Exactly.

Mr. Goldstein: There's one more interesting case study. If you're familiar with Juno token in the Cosmos ecosystem, anybody heard of that? Crazy case study. Won't bore you with the details as I'm not super familiar with it. But my understanding of what happened is Juno, it's token act that airdropped to all Cosmos folders one to one. And somebody did a civil attack by splitting the Cosmos to multiple wallets and accumulating this Juno token. And then after the airdrop consolidated into one wallet, the owner claimed that this was going on because they were representing multiple, their F manager representing multiple different clients and then decided to consolidate that to manage it from a fund structure. Theoretically viable explanation, practically don't know how good it is. But the community revolted saying, well, we should work the protocol to override the airdrop and was up for a vote six months ago. The owner said, no, I will not sell all good. I'm with the community, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. Six months later, started selling. And now they're going through a fork and it's supposed to be any day. now, I think in two days, the final vote should be in if they will fork to override his airdrop six months ago. Which is wild to think that this is essentially seizing assets from a stakeholder on chain as a community.

squarishbread: I guess the argument is that it was kind of a hack.

Mr. Goldstein: In a way, same as like Ribbon had their exploits, but they forced the fund there to return the funds to the treasury, which they did.

squarishbread: Is this the one where the VC knew about the airdrop and farmed wallets?

Mr. Goldstein: Yeah, exactly. Yeah, this is my beat, maybe somewhat similar, but who knows who holds the wallet actually. But here the community decided to fork to prevent that individual having so much power over the protocol. Where is this possible in decentralized land? It's the same as the US using Russia asset. Just saying we're going to influence because we feel like that. Right or wrong, it's still seizing assets of another entity.

squarishbread: And all the people, yeah.

Mr. Goldstein: Yeah, that's wild. Decentralized governance and what you can do with voting is absolutely crazy. And I think coming back to juice box, there's a lot of interesting things for the protocol to explore with the initiation of faking and starting to see who and how is committed to the protocol and for which term.

Nicholas: So we think that maybe it's not such a big deal that the governance positions are. I mean, it does seem like there's maybe an opportunity to do something better than the situation, current situation with JBX, where you could sort of just in time influence a vote just by purchasing off an AMM and selling as soon as the vote is complete, which AMMs are maybe not. I mean, I watched the price of Gnosis token dump right after their pre-announced snapshot. So like AMMs are aware of some things about governance, but maybe biweekly votes. I don't know to what extent AMMs are responsive to the snapshot window closing or Governor Bravo in the future. closing.

squarishbread: AMMs are just like the place where people trade, right? I think the market is generally aware and if it's a significant impact on the protocol for the most and it's been well publicized, the token definitely trades based on how that governance proposal goes.

Jango: Yeah, let's play out an example, like a somewhat extreme example. There's another DAO which wants to debit of the like half the treasury for some like arbitrary initiative. They put in a proposal and then I guess go in and offer everyone with a set of votes like a lot, like overwhelmingly more than their NFTs backed by. What would happen? What would like how they pull that off and what would happen in that case? Like they would first have to like, well, I guess it's somewhat assuming that folks with the vote are already have the thing listed somewhere, right? Like there's some liquidity for those assets or they like, well, like they have access to like message everybody and be like, yo, I'm gonna OTC like offer you this thing. And then folks with those tokens have to be like down for it. And I guess the worst case is like, all right, everyone's down. So the majority of token holders of the protocol who like have maybe stewarded and like built up the protocol essentially like left the protocol with like maybe like around the same amount that the proposal was offering to debit from the treasury. And so even though like the token holders lost access to the treasury, they probably gained a fat sum individually, like now all together and like a fork of the protocol and be like, wait, start over. Or yeah, cause I mean, if you're gonna, if you're gonna influence a vote to that extent, you have, you're gonna have to probably offer as much or more the things backed by anyways.

Nicholas: There are a lot of people who are sort of ambivalent. So I wonder if there's like, you could imagine it as like, okay, I'm just getting paid to something that I would have voted for anyway, would be one scenario. So it's just financial incentive for people voting. But then if maybe the majority or I don't know, a large portion of the tokens are apathetic to voting, maybe just sort of leave it in there because you say, well, I don't really have enough tokens to like swing a vote. So my voting doesn't really matter one way or the other. So I might as well earn yield on it by renting out my tokens or staked positions, whatever it might be. But it does require some coordination on the part of the person trying to sway the vote and likely their ability to financially quantify the gains for themselves or whatever they're trying to enable in order to justify the probably pretty expensive operation.

squarishbread: I think that the JBX burning function for a portion of the treasury is the thing that really protects you there. Right. It almost makes it okay to have the votes be more liquid, right. And to have the NFCs be tradable. Because people rage quit. And so this is what, you know, like Curve doesn't have a treasury. Right. And so this isn't something that they could do. And so like the locked version saves them.

Jango: Yeah. I wonder if the locked Banny NFT should just be redeemable in the same way the liquid version is. So you can't, I mean, you can't, it'll take the float off the market, but it'll still be backed by the treasury on demand. You can still burn it anytime and get the treasury back or assets back.

squarishbread: I mean, in theory, you could, you could try to create some kind of peg between JBX tokens and the NFTs with like some kind of studio AMM, right. Where people can trade, you know, in blocks of JBX or blocks of NFTs.

Mr. Goldstein: Let's be real for a second. People arbitrage that for a second in a second. Same as we, as we see now people arbitraging the redemption, redeem function and the AMM we'll see a third variable here entering them entering, which is the value of the fees.

squarishbread: Yeah, no, no question. No question. But I think that that's almost like the opportunity for arbitrage is in theory efficiently goes away because the market finds those and takes advantage of them until there's no longer opportunity to arbitrage. That's why the slippage goes down between DAI and USDC in the curve pools over time. Right. Because like people with lots of money will go in and like trade all their DAI for USDC if there's an advantage to do that.

Jango: Yeah, I think it's, I think the arbitrage is net positive for sure.

squarishbread: If you want those things to be liquid, then that arbitrage, you know, is like a feature, not a bug.

Nicholas: Do we see people arbitraging the redemption versus the AMMs currently?

Jango: Yeah. Yeah. I think there are like at least two bots that are just comparing the prices and making trades like the price of GBX as a four right now. It gives the price tips beneath and someone's going to go in the market, buy it and then redeem it, make some ETH off that trade.

Nicholas: Does that cap the upside of the token or it means that the response should be governance to increase the discount rate?

Jango: It's fairly healthy. I think Mr. Kohlstein can probably speak to it.

Mr. Goldstein: It limits the downside. So the bottom is actually capped and in reality, it slightly increases the floor value of the GBX token every time it happens because the bonding curve is the redemption rate is 95%, meaning that the redeemer is always leading 5% of the table by that increasing the future value of the next token redeemed.

Jango: Yeah, but it's sitting at the floor for a while now and there's also the price ceiling, which protocol is willing to mint more tokens at, which is pretty far off the market price. But I mean, the market has like very little liquidity, so it's hard to even make these like these judgments as how the network is actually valued. But it is cool to see like the floor working and in the past, see the ceiling working. The spread between those is pretty far right now.

Mr. Goldstein: I consider that to be healthy. There absolutely should be a spread and this spread is just a representation of a potential future value cap that new token holders can have and the size of the opportunity. The longer it goes, the size of opportunity increases, which is net positive for new token holders because you never want to buy at the max and that just tells you how far off from the max that you are.

Jango: Yeah, and this is with the DAO and not touching AMMs at all as is currently happening. Like as things continue to be distributed and we move more on chain with governance and the issuance rate keeps decreasing, it might be strategic to start interacting more with the AMM.

Mr. Goldstein: Yeah, I can see interacting a little bit more with the AMM to support some of the liquidity being beneficial for the DAO as well. It's interesting to see the market completely discounting any future revenue for the DAO. And pricing it just based on treasury, which is mostly what's happening now. It's kind of surprising considering the existing track record.

Nicholas: Are you running your own models on data to determine how the AMMs are pricing JBX? Or is that something that there are dashboards for in DeFi that help you figure it out?

Mr. Goldstein: We've built a model and made it public of how this should look like. It's on the JBX notion of how we model JBX for everybody to see. It's not a secret. And the beauty of it is building it public.

Nicholas: And that helps to describe the current price on the AMMs as well. This distance you're talking about between the JBX minting price and the AMMs.

Mr. Goldstein: Indeed. It's out of date probably by two weeks. I think the cycles of updating it every month, which is fair, but it should give you a good understanding of how to think about those variables.

squarishbread: Well, I guess if you're an arbitrage bot, though, you don't really care about the future value too much. You're just trying to take care of the current price. So the broader market might price it one way and think about long-term holding the JBX. If you're an arbitrage bot, you don't care about future cash. All you care about is the AMMs.

Mr. Goldstein: But not everybody's an arbitrage bot.

squarishbread: No. Yeah, sorry. I didn't mean to.

Mr. Goldstein: The HODLers, and there's enough HODLers, are not pricing that.

Nicholas: But the HODLers would be... I mean, does the arbitrage bot not just represent what the HODLers' opinion is ultimately? Because if they... I suppose we're assuming that the HODLers are all tapped out with regards to investing more in JBX.

Mr. Goldstein: Based on the data that we have, yeah, you can assume that because we don't see any price action.

Nicholas: Interesting. That's a bit weird. Or just the discrepancy, I don't know, the lack of movement in the token from, you know, I don't know when I last checked, but whatever. It doesn't move around that much. Certainly doesn't seem to move up very much. So people believe it's a strange indicator that that price doesn't move that much. I mean, maybe what it says about Juicebox is that people prefer to earn JBX or I don't know. I mean, there are some people who have accumulated a lot through AMMs. I guess they're the top 10 or whatever. There's a handful who are investor accumulators.

squarishbread: Yeah. But you could also say that it's just the disparity of information between the broader public and those people. Because if I didn't know Mr. Goldstein in real life, then I wouldn't really know how crazy the cash flow is. Right. And so you almost need like a community element of like, hey, by the way, everyone, cash flow is insane. Right. Like that's what you saw that with Chainlink. You saw it with Ripple. You saw it with Cardano. You know, there comes this like grassroots craziness that does all the marketing for you. And you kind of need people to be explaining over and over again, like, look, value this like a traditional business model. Look at the cash flow. This token is wildly undervalued. That's almost like the way. I mean, that's one way of marketing out there of why it makes sense to buy this thing and hold it long term. If that's a goal to bring the price up.

Jango: Yeah. In my mind, it's like right now the folks getting GBX mostly are the projects that are building and paying the fees, but they're getting it at such a terrible rate compared to the market. And I think like out of principle, we've been avoiding attaching or composing with AMMs, which I think is it's good for the time being. But if we can, especially with the B2 mechanic stuff, we can plug in directly to an AMM so that you're paying a fee. Maybe the treasury doesn't get the fee directly anymore. Just the buy pressure. Then the GBX is just going to the projects, paying the fee, and that can just kind of proliferate the token. Do folks building the network and then meanwhile, potentially issue some like reserve tokens. Every interaction to builders in the DAO could be interesting also. But I'm totally with you. It's like matter of information and definitely don't mind the attention being on building stuff and not on price.

Mr. Goldstein: That's probably the healthy part when the attention is on building and not price. I think that the fact that there's such a discrepancy is a lot tied to information, but it's also tied to understanding how all this works. I spent some time today with a builder in space and it took me probably an hour to walk through half of it until somebody actually, until it clicks. And at the end of the day, if we look at the VEAM, took the market a year and a half to understand it.

Jango: Yeah, it's kind of that thing where like, because of that dynamic, there's certainly a lot of leverage held by the building and with information, but there's also a lot of responsibility, like fiduciary responsibility, some capacity to like, uh, read the tokens to folks who may not know as much like those projects paying fees, but are still building to like, make sure they get, because like, it's theoretically in the holder's best interest to like issue, no GBX and fees come in. So there's still cash flow, but there's no GBX, uh, new GBX being minted. But it's like great in like short term theory. And so that's all you care about, but probably not very sustainable or deploy doesn't really grow a, like a network that's at equilibrium for a while. So how can we like actually get projects and folks contributing to the network growth, more of the network, like more like that decision-making power, because ultimately these projects should be the ones helping make the decisions for governance and whatnot. And they're going to be the ones that are going to be able to spread the information the best once they've started building on, on the system and understand how to configure funding cycles and such. And then like, that's going to be the winning situation, right? When there's not just a handful of people that like you, who are spending that hour and a half talking to folks, but there's more folks who are having those conversations. And at the same time, we're getting better and building better experiences for folks to come in and learn quickly, or at least like dip their toe in the water.

squarishbread: I like that way of framing that quite a bit. Like you should be thinking of, I think the way, like, don't, you know, rule out price action entirely as a goal. The goal should be to one, help DAOs govern their own DAOs better, right? I think that's the goal of GBA. And two, to grow revenue. And so if you've, if you think about it, like with those two things as the primary goals, the tokenomics should assist that, not hurt it in any way. Right. And so, you know, when you're thinking about like where the arbitrage opportunities are or anything like that, revenue and making it better for DAOs, not really thinking about price backed up the market more broadly. I guess at the risk of offering unsolicited advice.

Jango: No, same page.

Nicholas: It's interesting because the projects, like, I don't know what the top, which projects received the most JBX. I imagine the largest ones, Constitution, Assange, Shark, Moon.

Mr. Goldstein: Not Constitution. No, it was Zero Fee.

Nicholas: Oh, Zero Fee, right, of course, of course.

Mr. Goldstein: But that's a very interesting comparison to Assange or Shark that do hold JBX in their treasury and influence governance and theoretically have an asset on quote unquote balance sheet.

Nicholas: Poor Constitution DAO. They missed out on that fee. They should have paid that fee.

Mr. Goldstein: In retrospect, history will tell us, but, you know, all of us collectively are thinking, yeah.

Nicholas: We the people.

Mr. Goldstein: We the people say, yeah.

Nicholas: What I like to think about the fee is like one of the hardest problems for new DAOs is setting up governance. And I think that will be the case even once there are sort of turnkey templates and stuff. And to have the fee as a sort of non-governance choice to partake in token issuance of JBX is very handy on a governance side of things even more than as an economic decision. It's a decision you don't have to make if you choose Juicebox and you don't get special circumstances.

Mr. Goldstein: Yeah, absolutely.

Nicholas: It's pretty cool. Interesting. So the discount rate then is, you were saying some ways of maybe rewarding builders more. I guess part of my question about Assange DAO and Constitution, et cetera, is like, are Juicebox projects, are there long-term Juicebox projects? There are some I can think of, but it's not clear that they're always the biggest ones. Although I guess we don't know what could happen in the future with making those tokens meaningful again in other ways. Have you seen like burn your Assange token to get an Assange NFT from this artist or whatever?

Jango: No, no. And it takes a long, well, maybe off platform, not quite sure. I think a lot of airdrop to token holders we're starting to see. And it's kind of a, I mean, there's a lot of things, even in the V1 protocol that never got used or really baked into the user experience. And it's good to show like, yeah, we can build all kinds of things and flexibilities and interesting tidbits in the protocol. Doesn't mean you should throw them all at people at once. And like oftentimes those utilities are more like just in case, like if there's overwhelming demand to go in that direction. And, but I think a lot of the V2 stuff was like, sure V1 had a couple of things that we never closed, but it didn't have like the real things that like, man, we wish we had allowed projects to evolve past a fundraise effectively into like more of a cash flow state, which, which JVX obviously had, cause like the fee thing is built into the protocol and those projects kind of working closely with JVX, like Wagmeat Studios and Canoe, now Peel, like they are doing well because they have the regular cash flow from the Juicebox treasury to them to build, build out the ecosystem in some way. But there's really not the biggest projects. I think the biggest projects are like the more memetic moments of like fundraising for certain things, which I think like they're absolutely fascinating because every single one is played out slightly differently. Shark was the first one and they absolutely crushed it. But we learned so much in that, in that experiment, because like we had never done something like that before and they're still picking. And I think the community there is probably stronger now than it's been in a while, like since among like the first couple of weeks and months of the project. And Moondow is like incredible. And I think like what they did was, what that was like really cool. I definitely think folks should pay attention to is they ran like that first moon cycle, funding cycle, which is sitting 28 days from full moon to full moon. And it was a pretty slow couple of weeks to start out. I think there was a lot of like early people there and building the vision and the energy, but they were willing to kind of pivot the narrative. And then a lot of folks like Nassaj and Constitution and Moon and even Shark, everyone started with a, like a pre-commit situation where they were started to build the idea of what everyone's trying to do. And then like in some emoji ticker and a discord would be like, who's down to put, you know, 0.1, 0.11, et cetera. And then when like the treasury dropped, then it was like a moment and then it's live. And then you start to like convert a lot of that built up discord energy into like a natural movement. And then, so we started to see these like big treasuries play out. And so it's like interesting now as we start to like research and study, like how to better do onboarding and whatnot. Cause there's a lot of, like, there's an impulse to treat JVX as like a fundraising platform, since those are the ones that get the attention, but the ones that have been around for a long time, part of the ones like doing the work and like really like holding everything together. And I think they're starting to get rewarded for what they do, especially kind of in terms of JVX. And there's still a lot of work to do there. And I think like we can't, I think like that's the strong sort of juice box protocol in general is to create these open source businesses that last.

Nicholas: And they also have been accumulating JVX. And it's interesting because the existence, it's the same thing as the tokens. It's like hoarding the tokens, be it Shark or JVX may seem to make, to protect the earlier investors or contributors participants, but in fact, it limits the growth of the thing. And juice box being willing to spend its treasury on contractors that are other projects on the protocol allows those projects to allow us for both distribution of JVX and proof of concept for maybe what's like the heart and soul of juice box, which is these kinds of enduring projects that grow the, I mean, the memetic ones also grow the protocol in a different way, but just being the memetic projects wouldn't be enough. It's nice to have this loop where it ends up the funds go into JVX, into juice box, and then funds go out to the contributing projects. And they also become stakeholders of JVX and govern the future.

Jango: For sure. I think that's actually a big unexplored thing. is unrelated projects, just routing reserve tokens to each other, just to like bind communities together, especially with the juice box community. If you're already paying a fee in some capacity, but why not throw another 10% of your reserve tokens to juice box to get everyone on your team or like, Hey, like, fuck it. Like let's take 20% and let's send some to shark, even though we have nothing to do with them because they have a strong community. Right. And so if we win, then shark wins. And so they want us to win. So hell yeah.

squarishbread: Oh, sorry. Go ahead. I was just going to say, that's like a tried and true thing. You know, NFTs offer whitelist spots to other NFT projects that they want to get involved. And there's also a ton of DeFi airdrops to other groups that they wanted to get involved. Like if they know that this other project is like ODD5 or it's a bunch of whales or something like that, they'll do a big airdrop to those, to holders of those tokens. So it's similar dynamic.

Jango: In general, just the proliferation of your token is the goal is the exchange of your token is the goal. And so if you have like five contributors and you're just thinking like, oh, how can we divide this fairly between us five? You're kind of missing the point. Like that token should probably get into as many people as possible to make each unit work more in a decision making perspective and like a community building perspective and in all kinds of ways.

squarishbread: Yeah. I think Koopa Troopa was saying something about this the other day in terms of like and talking about how like, you know, five to 10% should definitely be distributed to the community as a way to get people involved, spread it out in a line of benefit.

Nicholas: Ultimately, like 100% of it should belong to those people. Those are the people. without those people, the whole thing just doesn't exist. Like it's nice that Juicebox has no VC, no formal VC, because it really is just. it was available on the market and you could get it for working for it or in a way you can kind of get it for working on contributing to it.

squarishbread: That's exactly right. I guess I was referring specifically like a distribution, but totally.

Mr. Goldstein: Friends on that happy note, I have to drop to put my kid to bed.

Jango: Yeah, super good hearing your voice. It's been a little while. Let's do it more often. And it's super good to see that that PFP on you. Can't wait to order all rock and one.

Mr. Goldstein: Absolutely. We should catch up.

squarishbread: Thanks for having me on. All great meeting you guys.

Nicholas: Yeah, thanks for coming, everybody. See you next week.

Mr. Goldstein: See you, folks.

squarishbread: Bye bye.

Nicholas: Bye.